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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
*

LAURIE P. WALL,

*

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, *

Case No. 20060312-CA

*

vs.
CORY R. WALL,

*
*
*

Trial Court Case: 994908054 DA

Appellant/Cross-Appellee. *
*

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this brief there are two volumes that are transcripts of proceedings in the lower
court. "R. 1204/Trl" refers to the first volume from proceedings held on November 1,
2006. "R. 1205/Tr2" refers to the second volume from proceedings held March 17, 2006.
"R" refers to the record of the court and "Ex" refers to exhibit, followed by the exhibit
number.
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
Appellant shall be designated as the "Respondent" and the Appellee shall be designated
at the "Petitioner," consistent with the parties' designations in the lower court.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to the provisions of Section
Auiciv

••>: the UuiM c onstitution, Kuk

I.I '.7X-">M-

», (!,^ i i.ii, Kuics ol Appellate Procedure,
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARDS FOR REVIEW

A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REDUCE OR
TERMINATE THE RESPONDENT'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION TO THE
PETITIONER.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
a) The trial court's interpretation of binding case law is a question of law
reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the lower court's
interpretation. State v. Richardson, 843 i

Jtah app. iV92Y

b) The correctness of error standard means that no particular deferens i,
given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932 (Utah 1994).
c) Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly
erroneous standard. Pena at 936;
B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RETROACTIVELY APPLY THE CHILD SUPPORT MODIFICATION PROVIDED
FOR IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-45-9.3(4).
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
a) The trial court's interpretation of case law presents a question of law and
the appellate court reviews the trial court's interpretation of that law for
correctness. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 1992);
b) The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865
P.2dl355, 1357 (Utah 1993).
c) Whether a statute operates retroactively is a question of law which is
reviewed for correctness without any deference to the trial court. Evans &
Sutherland Computer Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 953 P.2d
435 (Utah 1997).
d) The Court of Appeals accords the lower court's statutory interpretations
no particular deference, but assesses them for correctness as it would any
other conclusion of law.

C. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
a) The trial court's interpretations of rules of procedure is a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah
1993);
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of discretion standard, if the trial court made a determination of law that
provides the premise for denial of a new trial, such legal decision is
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P.2d 937, 939-40 (Utah 1993).
D. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S
!;H

'OHII' PITITIONI-'R.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
a) The trial court's interpretation of case law presents a question of law and the
•- . U i - ' S S .

State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 1992);

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following authorities are set forth in detail in the appendix due to their length:
1 $30-3-5(8)(g)(I) Utah Code Annotated.
. r

... s i.

Ian ( ode Annotated.

3. §78-45-9.3(4) Utah Code Annotated.
4. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

SI ATIMKNI ()l TNIK ASI,
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from the Order Modifying Decree
of Divorce and Judgment and Order Denying Respondent's Motion for New Trial of the
M .•>•!« •

c^pondent's petition to modify his child support obligation to
4

the Petitioner but denied his petition to reduce or terminate his alimony obligation to the
Petitioner; denied his request that the child support modification be made retroactive to
the month following date of service of the Petition to Modify on the Petitioner pursuant
to the provisions of §78-45-9.3(4); denied his request for an award of attorney's fees; and
awarding Petitioner a judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of $3,972.50.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: On November 1, 2005, the Respondent's
Verified Motion for Modification of Decree of Divorce came on for trial before the Third
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, District Court Judge, presiding.
Following a one day trial, the court granted that portion of the Respondent's petition
wherein he was seeking a reduction in his child support obligation to the Petitioner. The
trial denied, however, the Respondent's request that his alimony obligation to the
Petitioner be either reduced or terminated; and that the reduction in his child support be
made retroactive to the month following service of the petition to modify on the
Petitioner.
The trial court took under advisement the parties' respective requests for an award
of attorney's fees. After the parties submitted their affidavits of attorney's fees incurred,
the trial court ordered that Petitioner be awarded a judgment for attorney's fees in the
amount of $3,972.50.
The Order Modifying Decree of Divorce and Judgment was entered by the trial
court on January 16, 2006. (R. 1106-1109)
Following the entry of the Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce, the
Respondent filed with the trial court his Motion for New Trial which came on for hearing
5
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: Following the trial on November 1,

entered its Order Modifying Decree of Divorce and Judgment which provides in pertinent
part the following:

his child support obligation to the Petitioner was granted and the decree was modified to
provide that the Respondent's child support obligation to the Petitioner be reduced to
$97^

'(it i .iiiiiilliiiiL ilVerlivHK-ieniUr I MM)1.
! All other provisions of the decree not specifically modified by the order are to

remain in full force and effect.
3
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$3,972.50 against the Respondent.

* i E M E N T O F FA< ' I •'•.

The parties to this action were originally UUIHU ii

*>

City, Utah. (R. 545. 1OQP ~. 1204/R. 1204/Trl. 9). fhe parties separated in February,
i ^^

eiiuoner later initiating the divorce action in

December, 1999 (R. 1) They were subsequently divorced pursuan

I \vnv

:*.

entered by the court on or about November 2, 2000. (R. 555-563, 1098). Said Decree of
. c reflected the terms and conditions of a settlement agreement entered into and
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signed by the parties at a mediation held on September 1, 2000. (R. 523-534, 1098) The
agreement which was reached by the parties occurred after and was the result of extended
negotiations between them, with each of them being represented by competent counsel.
(R. 546; R. 1204/R. 1204/Trl. 36)
At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the parties had been married for
19 years. There are three children born as issue of the marriage, to-wit: Jennifer Laurie
Wall, born November 14, 1987 (now age 18); Natalie Ann Wall, born April 21, 1993
(now age 13); and, Emily Corinne Wall, bom September 19, 1995 (now age 10). (R. 545,
1098)
As agreed by the parties and as set forth in the Decree of Divorce, the parties were
awarded the joint legal custody of their children with the Petitioner being awarded the
primary physical custody subject to the Respondent's parent-time rights. (R. 527-528,
556, 1098)
At the time of the mediation and execution of the settlement agreement and entry
of the Decree of Divorce, the parties had been separated for over one and half years
during which time the Petitioner was unemployed and had no income. (R. 503, 504, 545;
R. 1204/Trl. 10, 12) However, at the time of the marriage, she was employed full-time
(R. 1204/Trl. 9, 10) and during the course of the marriage, she held numerous jobs and
was gainfully employed for much of the marriage earning as much as $20.00 per hour.
(R491-498; R. 1204/Trl. 23)
The Respondent is self employed as an attorney. Due to the nature of his practice
as a self employed individual, his income has fluctuated. At the time of the divorce, the
7

Respondent's most current and accurate income information consisted of his 1999
income tax returns which reflected a gross annual income of $56,808.00 which equated to
a gross monthly income of $4,734.00 (R. 1099).
Among the many issues involved in the case and those which pertain to the
Respondent's petition to modify and this appeal is the fact that it was agreed between the
parties that the Respondent would pay alimony to the Petitioner in the amount of $800.00
per month which the Petitioner agreed was an acceptable alimony award. (R. 531, 550,
560, 1098; R. 1204/Trl. 94)
It was further agreed and ordered that Respondent would pay child support to the
Petitioner in the amount of $1,200.00 per month. (R. 528, 556, 1098) Said child support
amount was based upon the Respondent's average gross monthly income at the time with
no income being imputed to the Petitioner as she was unemployed. (R. 536-537) It
exceeded the Child Support Guidelines by approximately $30.00 per month. (R. 1099)
Following the execution of the settlement agreement and the entry of the Decree
of Divorce, the Petitioner, rather than seeking any employment, entered the University of
Utah in the fall of 2000. (R. 1204/Trl. 12) She completed her studies in August, 2003,
receiving a bachelors degree in speech communications at that time. (R. 1204/Trl. 13, 17,
80)
The Respondent filed the subject Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce
on March 3, 2003 seeking a termination or reduction in his alimony obligation pursuant
to §30-3-5(8)(g)(I) Utah Code Annotated and a reduction in his child support obligation
to the Petitioner pursuant to §78-45-7.2(8)(b) Utah Code Annotated. (R. 564-574) The
8

Petitioner was served with the Summons and Verified Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce on March 4, 2004 (R. 575-577) Said petition was based upon the Respondent's
claim of Petitioner's substantial and material change in her circumstances due to her
having obtained a college degree and becoming available and more qualified to obtain
employment and earn an income with which she could support herself and assist in the
support of the parties' minor children. (R. 566, 567)
After the Respondent's initiation of the petition to modify, the Petitioner finally
did make efforts to become employed and had, in fact, been intermittently employed
during the pendency of the modification action earning as much as $3,167.00 per month
as recently as July, 2005. (R. 1099; R. 1204/Trl. 13, 15) As of the date of trial in the
modification action, Petitioner was employed full time, earning a gross annual salary of
$32,000 which equates to a gross monthly income of $2666.00 (R. 1204/Trl. 17; R. 942,
1100)
At the time of the trial on Respondent's Petition to Modify, he had a gross annual
income, after deducting reasonable business expenses, of $56,472.00 which equates to a
gross monthly income of $4,706.00. This amount is reflective of the Respondent's
current ability to earn. (R. 1100)
This matter came on for trial on November 1, 2005, on Respondent's Verified
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce wherein the Respondent sought a termination or
reduction in his alimony obligation to the Petitioner as well as a reduction in his child
support obligation as a result of the Petitioner's graduation from college and subsequent
employment.
9

Petitioner asserted and claimed throughout the modification proceeding that
neither the alimony nor the child support obligations of the Respondent were subject to
change and should remain in place as set forth in the Decree of Divorce and contended
that the decree should not be modified. (R. 788)
At the conclusion of the trial on November 1, 2005, the trial court ruled and
ordered that the Respondent's child support obligation to the Petitioner be modified based
upon the parties' respective gross monthly incomes and applying the statutory child
support guidelines. Respondent's child support obligation was reduced to $977.00 per
month effective December 1, 2005. (R. 1204/Trl. 139, 141)
However, the court declined to apply the child support modification retroactively
as allowed under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9.3(4). (R. 1204/Trl.
141; R. 1101) The trial court made a finding that the implementation of the retroactivity
provisions of §78-45-9.3(4) would adversely affect the children and that the Petitioner
did not have the ability to pay back to the Respondent the retroactive amount of
approximately $4,000.00. (R. 1204/Trl. 141, 142; R. 1101)
With respect to the alimony issue, the court declined to modify the Respondent's
alimony obligation to the Petitioner and determined that said alimony award should
remain, consistent with the provisions of the Decree of Divorce. (R. 1204/Trl. 139). In
rendering its decision at the time of the trial, the court commented that the stipulations,
the findings and the decree stand on their own and are clear and that it would not consider
things which went into the parties' settlement negotiations at the time of the original
mediation. (R. 1204ATrl. 140, lines 6 - 9).
10

However, it then went on to address the needs of the Petitioner which existed at
the time of the decree and made a finding that there is nothing in the Stipulation, Findings
or Decree that led the court to believe the Petitioner agreed to the original alimony award
of $800.00 per month because it was enough to meet her needs. (R. 1204/Trl. 142, line
25; 143, lines 1 - 3; R. 1102) The court then went on to accept the Petitioner's claimed
living expenses contained in her Financial Declaration filed at the time of the divorce and
make a finding that the $800.00 per month alimony award did not meet her needs at the
time of the divorce. (R. 1204/Trl. 143, lines 3 - 23; R. 1101, 1102).
The court then took the parties' respective requests for attorney's fees under
advisement after allowing the parties to submit their respective fee affidavits and
requiring them to submit proof of what each of the parties had actually paid in attorney's
fees. (R. 1204/Trl. 101, 139, 146) After each of the parties had submitted their affidavits
and exchanged objections and responses thereto, the court awarded the Petitioner
attorney's fees in the amount of $3,972.50. (R. 1106)
On January 20, 2006, the Respondent filed his Motion for New Trial pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting that a new trial be
held on the issues of the Respondent's requested reduction/termination of alimony,
retroactive application of the child support award, and the award of attorney's fees. (R,
1113).
The hearing on Respondent's motion came on for hearing before the trial court on
March 17, 2006. (R. 1186; R. 1205/Tr2. 3). At that time, the trial court denied the
Respondent's motion. (R. 1205/Tr2. 20, line 6). It then went on to hold that it could look
11

at the Petitioner's current living expenses which Respondent had argued should not be
considered. (R. 1205/Tr2. page 20, line 9). Further, the court held that if there are
findings in a decree that don't detail what the alimony is for, what it's to cover, what the
expenses are and what the incomes are of the parties, then it has the right to do that at the
time of modification and "go back and recreate that." (R. 1205/Tr2., page 20, lines 1822). The court acknowledged that what it had done was to go back and look at the
Petitioner's expenses at the time of the divorce and her present income now, plus the
alimony, and found that it still wasn't sufficient to meet the Petitioner's needs. In so
doing, it determined that the alimony should not be terminated. (R. 1205/Tr2., page 21,
lines 10-15). The Order denying the Respondent's motion was entered on March 28,
2006. (R. 1187).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The Respondent contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the terms of
the settlement agreement which was reached at the time of the divorce by re-writing
factual findings into that agreement after considering the Petitioner's Financial
Declaration submitted at the time of the divorce. The trial court found that, after
considering the Petitioner's claimed living expenses as set forth in that Financial
Declaration, the original alimony award was not sufficient to meet her needs, despite the
fact the Petitioner had agreed to accept the ordered amount. Respondent submits and
claims that the Petitioner's needs were negotiated and established at the time of the
divorce as set forth in the settlement agreement by accepting the sum of $800.00 per
month in alimony.
12

2. Respondent also contends the trial court erred by finding that the Petitioner had
not experienced a substantial material change in circumstances not contemplated in the
decree of divorce. Respondent contends that the decree did not contemplate the
Petitioner's changed circumstances which included her graduation from college and
obtaining employment.
3. In rendering its decision denying the Respondent's petition to terminate or
reduce alimony, the trial court considered the Petitioner's current needs which did not
exist at the time of the divorce. Respondent contends that by so doing, the trial accepted
and considered evidence contrary to the provisions of §30-3-5(8)(g)(ii).
4. In granting the Respondent's petition to reduce his child support obligation, the
trial court declined to make said reduction retroactive pursuant to the provisions of §7845-9.3(4) Utah Code Annotated. Respondent contends that the provisions of this statute
are mandatory in nature and require the trial court to make any adjustments in child
support and alimony awards which are part of a child support order retroactive to the
month following the date of service of the summons and petition to modify.
5. Respondent contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new
trial which was made on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence and surprise.
Respondent submits that the trial court erred by considering the Petitioner's claimed
living expenses both at the time of the divorce and at the time of the trial on the petition
to modify and that the same constituted surprise which was not contemplated by the
Respondent. Further, by considering said evidence, the Respondent submits that it was

13

insufficient to support the trial court's denial of his petition to reduce or terminate
alimony.
6. The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the Petitioner after the conclusion of
the trial on the petition to modify. At that time, the court failed to make any detailed
factual findings as to the ability of the Respondent to pay those fees and the need of the
Petitioner be awarded the same.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REDUCE OR TERMINATE
THE RESPONDENT'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION TO THE PETITIONER BASED
UPON THE PETITIONER'S SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES
It is well settled and established law in this state that an award of alimony is
subject to modification upon a showing of a substantial material change in circumstances
since the entry of the decree of divorce and not contemplated in the decree itself. Bolliger
v. Bolliger, 997 P.2d 903, 906 (Ut.App. 2000). Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(8)(g)(I)
provides in pertinent part: "The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce."
In Bolliger this court stated:
This court has articulated what is meant by "contemplated by the divorce decree":
The fact that the parties may have anticipated [a substantial
material change in circumstances] in their own minds or in their
discussions does not mean that the decree itself contemplates the
change. In order for a material change in circumstances to be
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contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence,
preferably in the form of a provision within the decree itself, that
the trial court anticipated the specific change. Durfee v. Durfee, 796
P.2d 713, 716 (Utah App. 1990). (Emphasis added)
Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft of any
reference to the changed circumstances at issue in the petition to modify,
then the subsequent changed circumstance was not contemplated in the
original divorce decree. Id. at 906.
More recently, this court reiterated the same rule in Smith v. Smith, WL 1405478,
Utah App. 1005 (June 16, 2005) when it stated: "In order for a material change in
circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence, preferably
in the form of a provision within the decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the
specific change." quoting Durfee, 796 P.2d at 716.
In this action, the Respondent maintained that the Petitioner experienced a
substantial material change in her circumstances not contemplated in the decree of
divorce. Specifically, the Petitioner, at the time of the divorce was unemployed and had
no income. Since the entry of the decree, she has returned to school, obtained a degree,
and is now employed.
Respondent maintains that while Petitioner has always been capable of working
and supporting herself, she was not so employed at the time of the settlement agreement
or at the time of the entry of the decree. Petitioner has taken the position that her going to
college and later returning to work were somehow contemplated at the time of the decree.
However, such a claim is baseless and is not supported by a review of the record. Neither
the settlement agreement which was prepared by Petitioner's counsel and signed by the
parties, nor the decree of divorce itself makes any reference whatsoever regarding any
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plans or contemplation that the Petitioner would go to college to obtain a degree and/or
return to work. As the record in this case is, in fact, "bereft of any reference to the
changed circumstances at issue in the petition to modify/' then they were not
contemplated in the decree.
There is nothing in the decree that contemplates this situation. The child support
was set according to the Respondent's income only. In this regard, it was contemplated
that the Petitioner would have no income at all. If the possibility of future income by the
Petitioner had been contemplated there would likely have been pertinent language in the
settlement agreement and the decree addressing this issue. There was not. There was no
credible evidence presented that Petitioner's increase in income was ever even
contemplated by the parties let alone in the decree itself. In addition, nothing in the
decree precludes the consideration of additional income as a basis for a substantial
change in circumstances warranting a modification petition.
In the few cases that have ever held a significant increase in income was
contemplated by the decree, there is, on the record, strong evidence that the increase in
income was not only contemplated but expected. Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726, 729 (Ut.
App. 1990). In Dana the court explicitly stated an expectation of significant growth in
the alimony receiver's income. Such express contemplations were used to determine the
obligations of the decree, including the amount of child support. Id.
The courts have reinforced this idea of requiring explicit statements regarding
future income. "We do not believe it makes for good law or sound policy to have parties
arguing years after the fact over what a trial court may or may not have considered when
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making an alimony award . . . the trial court must make findings indicating that the future
income has [or has not] been considered in making the present award. Such finding will
then allow the paying spouse to bring a modification proceeding at the appropriate time."
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 253-54 (Ut. App. 1993). Also, "since the divorce
decree at issue did not have a provision expressly anticipating an increase in
Respondent's income, and since Respondent did not offer any evidence at trial that the
trial court had previously anticipated the increase in income when the original divorce
decree was entered, we find that the increase was not a material change in circumstances
contemplated in the original divorce decree." Durfee, 796 P.2d at 716.
A vague reference in the original Findings of Fact that the Petitioner was an
unemployed student is not, by any stretch of the imagination, an explicit or express
reference to any contemplation that the Petitioner would one day complete her college
degree and get a job. Neither the settlement agreement nor the divorce decree contain
any express language regarding a future expectation or contemplation that the Petitioner's
income would increase. Had Petitioner truly contemplated a substantial increase in
income it would have been very easily included in the settlement agreement and the
decree and equity would certainly require as much. However, the facts support the
opposite. She agreed $800 was the amount required to support her standard of living
with no additional language that any increased income was contemplated or expected.
There are no provisions in the stipulation, findings or decree that it was expected that the
Petitioner would graduate from college, obtain employment, or have any income other
than the alimony and child support she agreed to accept from the Respondent.
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Looking at the Petitioner's actions over the last several years and the Respondent's
testimony, it is clear that the parties never contemplated a substantial increase in
Petitioner's income; let alone the fact that the decree itself is completely devoid of any
language supporting this assertion.
At the time of the divorce there was no assurance that the Petitioner would ever
finish her schooling or ever get a job. The record reflects that during the period of over
one and half years the parties were separated prior to the entry of the decree, the
Petitioner remained unemployed. During that time, she could have obtained employment
but chose not to. In the fall of 1999 and spring of 2000 she enrolled in and later dropped
classes at the University of Utah. As of September 1, 2000 when the parties attended
mediation and signed the settlement agreement, the Petitioner was not attending school
nor was she working. There was no indication at that time that she was intent on
becoming enrolled as a full time student or that she would ever follow through and
complete her education or that she intended to get a job.
As such, the Petitioner's obtaining of a college degree and subsequent
employment were and are substantial material changes in circumstances giving rise to
Respondent's claim for either a termination or reduction in his alimony obligation to the
Petitioner.
Respondent submits that the Petitioner's employment constitutes a substantial
material change in circumstances. In Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982)
the Utah Supreme Court held that the change in circumstances required to justify a
modification of a divorce decree varies with the type of modification sought. And, in the
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instance of modification of alimony, it held that where the former wife had become
employed, experienced a substantial increase in her income and had accumulated some
savings, such circumstances qualified as being substantial and material. It should further
be noted that the husband's income was about the same as it was at the time of the
divorce.
The Petitioner in this case has, as mentioned previously, become employed, is
making substantially more than her previous income which is the alimony payments
made by the Respondent, and she has accumulated some savings. Respondent's income
has remained virtually unchanged.
In Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaughu 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990) this court upheld
a termination of an alimony award under circumstances virtually identical to those
present in this case. In that case, the wife was not employed at the time of the divorce
and had no income from outside sources. During the four years after the divorce, she did
not work but instead went to college and obtained a Master's degree in social work.
Thereafter, she became employed and worked for Granite School District. At the time of
trial in that action, the wife was receiving approximately $22,000.00 per year from her
employment and other sources. The husband, on the other hand, had also experienced a
significant increase in his income, earning approximately eight times what he was
earning at the time of the divorce and his net worth had increased forty times.
The court held that it was appropriate to terminate alimony as it was satisfied that
the recipient spouse was now able to support herself at a level approximating the level
she enjoyed during the marriage despite the dramatic increase in the husband's post
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decree income. The court noted that the purpose of alimony is to allow the recipient
spouse a standard of living as close as possible to that experienced during the marriage,
not to provide subsequent improvements to keep pace with those of the payor spouse. Id.
at 243.
In addition, the Petitioner has maintained throughout these proceedings that the
alimony award in this case is "permanent'' and not subject to modification. Such a claim
is likewise without any legal basis. In Smith, cited supra, the court noted that an award
of "permanent alimony" may be modified upon appropriate petition. Id. quoting Munns
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

POINT II
COURT CANNOT ISSUE OR MODIFY ALIMONY BASED ON NEEDS OF
RECIPIENT SPOUSE WHICH DID NOT EXIST AT TIME OF DIVORCE
At the trial, the Petitioner submitted and the court accepted her current Financial
Declaration which shows significantly higher living expenses than those that existed at
the time of the divorce and some which did not even exist at that time. Obviously, this
was done in an attempt to show a justification for continued alimony when, in fact, based
on her own income and the addition of child support, Petitioner should easily be able to
maintain a standard of living equal to that at the time of the divorce.
At the time of the divorce Petitioner agreed that $800 per month in alimony
together with the child support would be sufficient to meet her needs. Since that time and
up to the point when she became employed, she had established that such was the case.
The only significant debt she incurred during that period were student loans she obtained
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in order to attend schooling which she chose to do instead of obtaining employment
which she was more than qualified to do. This fact alone is telling as to her needs.
Petitioner is now earning more than three times the alimony amount and yet she claims
she still needs the additional income in the form of ongoing alimony. This leads one to
question, if she has so much more income, how can she still require a supplemental
source? The answer is straightforward; she is claiming expenses that were not a part of
her standard of living at the time of the divorce.
The consideration of these current expenses by the trial court in determining
whether to maintain the current alimony award is erroneous. Utah Code Annotated §303-5(8)(g)(ii) provides:
The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
In Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 86 P.3d 767 (Utah App. 2004), the recipient had
become permanently disabled and unable to work to support herself. It indicated that this
type of situation was an example of what constituted "extenuating circumstances" in order
to consider post divorce needs. The Petitioner has suffered no such circumstances which
would warrant a consideration of her current needs/expenses. In fact, quite the opposite
is true in her situation. She was unemployed and had no income at the time of the
divorce and now has a college degree, is employed Ml time and earning a significant
income.
In this case, the Petitioner has, since the entry of the decree of divorce, increased
her mortgage indebtedness on her home, incurred student loans, personal medical bills
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and other claimed expenses that did not exist at the time of the decree of divorce. The
court cannot, under the above referenced authority, consider these items when
considering an alimony award to the Petitioner. In essence, the court should only
consider the need expressed by the Petitioner herself in the settlement agreement of
$800.00 per month for alimony. Inasmuch as she is now earning approximately three and
one-half times the amount of the existing alimony award, the Respondent should be
entitled to a termination of his alimony obligation to the Petitioner.
Further, the court cannot award alimony to the Petitioner in an amount more than
her established needs. In Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah App. 1994),
the court held that the trial court in that case should not have awarded to the recipient
spouse more than her established needs required, regardless of the payor spouse's ability
to pay any excess amount. (Emphasis added).
The practical effect of considering the Petitioner's increased current living
expenses and claiming that her increased income was contemplated in the decree of
divorce as a justification for continuing the Respondent's alimony obligation is to
basically disregard the original Stipulation and Settlement Agreement and re-do it. The
decree did not expressly contemplate the Petitioner's increase in income. Petitioner
agreed that $800 in alimony together with the original $1,200 in child support would
meet her needs. This was a court sanctioned agreement and one entered into by the
parties who were both represented by legal counsel. Petitioner has now been able to
actually increase her standard of living by obtaining a college degree and obtaining
employment.
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Petitioner now wants the court to go back and, in essence, controvert the facts
existing at the time of the divorce, and claim that the agreed upon alimony was
insufficient and that it must have been contemplated that she would be working to
support herself; none of which is referred to in any way in the language of the decree.
In Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court discussed a
similar situation as it pertains to a stipulated decree of divorce. There, the court held that
"when a decree is based upon a property settlement agreement, forged by the parties and
sanctioned by the court, equity must take such agreement into consideration. Equity is
not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply
because one has come to regret the bargain made." Id. at 1250-51
It is inherently unfair and unjust to now claim that for some reason, not articulated
in the decree, Petitioner truly needed more support than agreed to and that her subsequent
earnings of more than three times that amount could not constitute a substantial change in
circumstances. The terms of the agreement and the decree were premised on the fact that
the Petitioner was not employed and had no income. Both parties agreed to this and the
court sanctioned the agreement.
Furthermore, Respondent contends that had the court made an accurate and
appropriate evaluation of the parties' respective financial positions, it should have, at the
very least performed an income equalization analysis. The Petitioner's net monthly
income, including her receipt of child support is $3,287.42. The Respondent's net
monthly income, after paying the modified child support to the Petitioner is now
$3,206.58, resulting in Petitioner receiving $80.84 more per month than does the
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Respondent. When the Respondent is then obligated to continue paying alimony of
$800.00, the disparity becomes that much greater and is that much less equitable.
POINT III
PETITIONER'S NEEDS AT TIME OF DIVORCE WERE
AGREED TO BY STIPULATION AND CANNOT BE
RE-DETERMINED IN MODIFICATION PROCEEDING
Respondent asserts that the trial court erred in considering the Petitioner's August
2000 Financial Declaration. In this case, the parties entered into a binding Stipulation
and Settlement Agreement at the time of the divorce, settling all issues including the
payment of an alimony award to the Petitioner in the amount of $800.00 per month. The
terms of that agreement are reflected and contained in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce. Respondent contends and maintains that this amount
was agreed to by the parties, particularly the Petitioner, as sufficient to meet the needs of
the Petitioner.
The trial court was correct in stating that at the time of the divorce there were no
findings as to the specific needs of the Petitioner (R. 1204/Trl., page 142, lines 21-22).
The trial court was also correct in an earlier statement that the "stipulations, the findings
and the decree, I believe, stand on their own and are clear" in stating that it did not
consider what things went into the parties' settlement negotiations. (R. 1204/Trl., page
140, lines 6-8).
However, where the trial court erred is when it then examined, in detail, the
Petitioner's Financial Declaration filed in 2000 in making a determination that the $800
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alimony amount which the parties had agreed to in mediation did not meet the needs of
the Petitioner. In fact, at the hearing on Respondent's motion for new trial held on
March 17, 2006 the judge stated: "And if I have findings in a decree that don't detail
what - what the alimony is for, what it's to cover, what the expenses are and what the
incomes are of the parties, then I think what we have to do at the modification trial is
go back and recreate that." (R. 1205/Tr2., page 20, lines 18-22)(Emphasis added)
Such a determination by the trial court is clearly erroneous and contrary to the
established case law on this issue. The trial court, in essence, went behind the original
agreement of the parties which had been entered into five years earlier, and re-wrote it in
making a finding that the agreed upon amount did not meet the Petitioner's needs.
In doing so, the court completely circumvented the entire mediation process and
all that went into it.
In Davis v. Davis, 29 P.3d 676, (Utah App. 2001) this court quite clearly stated the
rule as it pertains to this very issue. It held:
[A stipulation] has all the binding effect of findings of fact and conclusions of
law made by the court upon the evidence. The rationale is that the stipulation
constitutes an agreement of the parties that all the facts necessary to
support i t . . . pre-existed and would be sustained by available evidence,
had not the agreement of the parties dispensed with the taking of evidence.
(Citing United Factors v. T.C. Assocs., Inc., 21 Utah 2d 351, 354, 445 P.2d 766,
768 (1968) (Emphasis added).
In this case and applying the holding in Davis, the Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement which was signed by the parties constituted an agreement that all of the facts
necessary to support it, including what the Petitioner's needs were with respect to
alimony, would be sustained and were sustainable by available evidence at that time. It is
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clearly an erroneous ruling by the trial court to, after the fact and five years later, make
some determination that the facts used to support the stipulation were something other
than what they actually were and in essence, re-write the agreement between the parties.
The purpose of mediation is to take the court out of the loop and allow the parties
to engage in arms length discussions and negotiations. It is the process of exchanging
information, give and take, and in many respect replaces or constitutes the aspect of
cross-examination which would otherwise occur at trial. Based upon the facts known to
the parties at the time of mediation, and with the advice of legal counsel, they entered
into an agreement whereby the Petitioner agreed to accept the sum of $800.00 per month
in alimony together with a child support award of $1,200.00.
By disregarding the stipulation, findings and decree which, in the words of the
trial court itself, "stand on their own and are clear" it re-inserted itself into the loop,
making a finding which was contrary to what the parties had previously agreed upon
based the information they had at the time of the mediation and execution of the
settlement agreement.
In Bennett v. Bennett, 2005 WL 3315331 (Utah App.) 2005 UT App 528, Dec. 8,
2005, this court, which cited Davis, supra, held that by entering into a stipulation, the
parties implicitly agree with the underlying facts and that a trial court and the parties are
bound by the parties' stipulation. Citing Yeargin, Inc., v. Tax Commission, 2001 UT 11,
U19, 20 P.3d 281. The court held that given the stipulation which the parties had entered
into, the trial court would not be able to receive other evidence contrary to the stipulation.
Id
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Accordingly, the trial court was not and should not have considered other evidence
which is contrary to the stipulation. This would include any evidence regarding the
Petitioner's claimed living expenses at the time of the divorce which were in dispute,
never litigated, and never found to be valid or accurate in any way. Not that he should
have been required to do so, given the opportunity, Respondent submits that he would
have been able to clearly establish the inaccuracy of the Petitioner's claimed expenses at
the time of the divorce. He was never allowed that opportunity as it was assumed the
trial court would follow the law on this issue and not consider those expenses. That issue
was settled, set and decided by the parties as contained in the stipulation and the court
cannot go back and re-write the agreement.
The Petitioner agreed at the time of the mediation that $800.00 per month in
alimony, together with what she would be receiving in the form of child support, was
sufficient to meet her needs. Even at the trial on the modification action, the Petitioner
herself testified that she would had requested $1,000.00 per month in alimony but in
order to settle, agreed to accept the $800.00 amount which was ultimately included in the
settlement agreement and the decree of divorce. (R. 1204/Trl., page 86, lines 15-17).
It is a well settled and established principle that with respect to stipulations entered
into between parties, they are conclusive and binding on the parties unless, upon timely
notice and for good cause shown, relief is granted therefrom. Higley v. McDonald, 685
P.2d 496 (Utah 1984), (Citing First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel &
Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979, and State v. Bailey, 282 P.2d 339 (Utah 1955).
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In Birsa v. Birsa, 2000 WL 33244127 (Utah App.2000) this court, in addressing a
decree of divorce which was the product of a stipulation between the parties, held:
"[T]here is an institutional hesitancy to relieve a party from a stipulation negotiated and
entered into with the advice of counsel." (Citing Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116
(Utah Ct.App.1989) see also In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074 (Utah 2000).
The Settlement Agreement in this case was the product of a long and involved
mediation session at which time the Petitioner was represented by counsel who was
present. Petitioner's counsel himself, drafted the agreement as well as the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. Petitioner should be bound
by the terms of that agreement including the agreement that the sum of $800.00 per
month in alimony was sufficient to meet her needs.
The Petitioner is now employed earning almost three and one-half times the
amount of alimony and her agreed upon needs as of the date of the divorce. She is now
able to more than meet those needs on her own without any further support from the
Respondent. Accordingly, alimony should be terminated.
POINT IV
ADJUSTMENTS IN CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY REQUIRED TO BE
RETROACTIVE TO COMMENCEMENT OF MODIFICATION ACTION
Under the present law, when the court orders a modification of child support and
spousal support under a child support order, it is required to be made retroactive to the
month following service of the summons and petition for modification. Utah Code
Annotated §78-45-9.3(4) provides:
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A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be
modified with respect to any period during which a modification is
pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee, if
the obligor is the Petitioner, or on the obligor, if the obligee is the
Petitioner. If the tribunal orders that the support should be modified, the
effective date of the modification shall be the month following service on
the parent whose support is affected. Once the tribunal determines that a
modification is appropriate, the tribunal shall order a judgment to be
entered for any difference in the original order and the modified amount for
the period from the service of the pleading until the final order of
modification is entered. (Emphasis added)
The use of the word "shall" as contained in this statute is commonly understood to
create a mandatory condition and it should be applied in this case. Paar v. Stubbs, 117
P.3d 1079 (Utah App. 2005). Where a provision contains both the words "shall" and
"may," it is presumed that the lawmaker intended to distinguish between them, "shall"
being construed as mandatory and "may" as permissive. Scannell v. City of Seattle,
97 Wash.2d 701, 705, 648 P.2d 435, 438 (Wash., 1982). Citing State ex rel. Public
Disclosure Comm'n v. Rains, 87 Wash.2d 626, 633-34, 555 P.2d 1368 (1976). When an
individual's rights depend upon giving the word "shall" an imperative construction,
"shall" is presumed to have been used in reference to that right or benefit and it receives a
mandatory interpretation. Jordan v. O'Brien, 79 Wash.2d 406, 410, 486 P.2d 290 (1971).
The language of the present statute clarifies previous versions which admittedly
gave the trial court discretion regarding the retroactivity of child support and alimony
modifications. However, the language of the current statute clearly directs the court to
make any modifications retroactive.
"Our primary goal when construing statutes is to evince 'the true intent and
purpose the Legislature [as expressed through] the plain language of the Act/ In doing
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so, we seek 'to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful/ and we accordingly
avoid interpretations that will render portions of the statute superfluous or inoperative."
Hall v. Utah State Dept. Of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 958.
The facts and analysis of a similar issue was raised and addressed in Wilde v.
Wilde, 35 P.3d 341 (Utah App. 2001). It involved a second appeal brought by the wife
concerning an alimony modification petition filed in 1994 and a request by her that an
alimony modification be made retroactive to the date the petition was served. That case
differed from this one in that during the course of those proceedings the legislature had
modified the provisions of U.C.A. §30-3-10.6(2), which is the predecessor statute to 7845-9.3(4) at issue here.
This case differs factually in that §78-45-9.3(4) was in place when Respondent
filed his petition for modification.
In Wilde, when the Respondent served the Petitioner with the modification
petition, §30-3-10.6(2) provided:
A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may
be modified with respect to any period during which a petition for
modification is pending, but only from the date notice of that petition
was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the Petitioner, or to the
obligor, if the obligee is the Petitioner.
The court stated that it had interpreted that section to give courts discretion to
determine both if and when a modified child support award should be made retroactive.
Id. at 345. (Citing, Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), and
Crockett v. Crockett 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
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The provisions of section 30-3-10.6(2) were then amended and renumbered which
provided:
A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be
modified with respect to any period during which a modification is
pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading on the
obligee, if the obligor is the Petitioner, or on the obligor, if the obligee
is the Petitioner. The tribunal shall order a judgment for the period
from the service of the pleading until the final order of modification
is entered for any difference in the original order and the modified
amount Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9.3(4) (Emphasis added)
The amendment added the sentence requiring the trial court to order a judgment
for the period from the service of the pleading until the final order, for any difference
between the original award and the modified amount. Id. at 346.
Since the holding in Wilde section 78-45-9.3(4) has been amended yet again by
the insertion of a new second sentence which states:

If the tribunal orders that the support should be modified, the effective
date of the modification shall be the month following service on the
parent whose support is affected..,.(Emphasis added)
The clear and unambiguous meaning of this amendment is a mandatory
requirement placed on the courts to retroactively apply modified support to the month
following service of the petition on the affected party. In the present case, this court
ordered that the Respondent's child support obligation to the Petitioner should be
modified in conformity with the child support guidelines using the parties' respective
current gross monthly incomes. In doing so, the provisions of section 78-45-9.3(4)
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require that modification to be implemented retroactively to the month following service
of the petition to modify on the Petitioner which, in this case, would be April, 2004.
It was inherently unfair and inequitable for the trial court to deny the
Respondent's request that this statutory provision be followed. During most of the time
this matter was pending before the trial court, the Petitioner was employed, either on her
own or as an employee with different companies. During that time, the Respondent
shouldered all of the child support obligation without receiving any relief as a result of
the Petitioner having become employed and sharing in that responsibility.
By not applying a modification retroactively, it removes any incentive on the part
of the affected party to bring the matter to conclusion. In fact, it promotes delay and
fosters increased litigation costs and attorney's fees. Respondent respectfully submits
that the current provisions of section 78-45-9.3(4) required the trial court to apply the
modified child support retroactively and, in addition, that the Respondent be awarded a
judgment against the Petitioner for the amount in question.
At trial, the court voiced its concern that to apply the modified support amount
retroactively would impose a hardship on the Petitioner and the children. However, such
is not the case, as the court could have fashioned any remedy it deemed necessary in
order to allow the satisfaction of the judgment over a period of time or to even stay
execution of the judgment to a later date.
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POINT V
NEW TRIAL IS NECESSARY WHERE COURT'S RULING
IS BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Under the provisions of Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may
petition the court seeking a new trial if the findings or rulings of the court in the initial
proceeding are not supported by sufficient evidence. Rule 59 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that
is against law.
Respondent submits that in denying his petition to either reduce or terminate his
alimony obligation, the court based its decision, to a large extent on the purported needs
of the Petitioner as set forth in her Financial Declaration dated August 4, 2000 rather than
what the Petitioner agreed to receive in the form of alimony when the case was settled
through mediation. The Respondent's petition to modify the alimony award was based
on the fact that Petitioner had obtained a college degree and, during the course of the
proceedings, become employed earning a significant income well in excess of the
alimony award. Neither party, particularly the Respondent, approached this matter in
terms of what the Petitioner's expenses were at the time of the divorce but rather what the
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Petitioner's ability was to support herself in light of her income from employment which
she did not have at the time of the divorce and the fact that her current income is more
than three times the current alimony award.
The Respondent should have had and should still have the opportunity to present
evidence concerning the Petitioner's claimed living expenses at the time of the divorce if
the court deems that to be relevant. The court's adoption of the Petitioner's August 4,
2000 Financial Declaration and finding that the Petitioner's claimed living expenses as
set forth in the document were reasonable without taking any evidence as to the
reasonableness of those expenses came as a total and complete surprise and is not
supported by sufficient evidence or existing law as previously set forth herein.
Respondent was unaware that the issue of the Petitioner's claimed living expenses
at the time of the divorce was going to be re-litigated in light of the fact that said issue
had already been negotiated and settled pursuant to the Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement.
At no time during the initial divorce proceedings did the Respondent ever stipulate
or otherwise agree that the living expense figures claimed by the Petitioner were accurate
or reasonable. In fact, quite the opposite is true as evidenced by Respondent's pleadings
filed at the time. The Petitioner's claimed living expenses were always a hotly contested
issue during the initial proceedings and should not have been adopted by the court as
reasonable without a sufficient showing of evidence to support the same.
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POINT VI
PETITIONER NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES

In this action, both parties requested an award of attorney's fees each incurred in
the prosecution and defense of the matter.

It is this Respondent's position that

Petitioner should not have been awarded attorney's fees in any amount whatsoever. This
is based on the fact that this Respondent filed and prosecuted his petition for modification
of the decree of divorce in good faith and his claims have merit based upon the
Petitioner's substantial material change in circumstances which includes her employment
and earning an income which resulted in a decrease in the Respondents' child support
obligation.
There are, of course, several factors the court must consider in determining
whether to award attorney's fees in divorce modification proceedings. In Wilde vs.
Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, 349 (Utah App., 2001), the Utah Court of Appeals stated that:
To recover attorney fees and costs in modification proceedings, 'the
requesting party must demonstrate his or her need for attorney fees, the
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees.'
Citing, Larsen 888 P.2d at 726. Utah appellate courts have reversed
attorney fee awards where the requesting party has failed to show any one
of these factors. Citing Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993)

In addressing these factors as they apply to the Petitioner, she is currently
employed and has the ability to pay her own attorney's fees. Respondent, quite frankly,
does not have the ability to pay the Petitioner's attorney's fees in light of the fact that he
has incurred his own fees in the prosecution of this action and has his own obligation
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which he must meet. Finally, the amount of fees requested by the Petitioner were clearly
unreasonable. In Wilde the court cited several factors which constitute unreasonableness
of fees. It stated that:
The trial court found that Respondent's requests were unreasonable
because: (1) "it is impossible to tell from the evidence presented . . . [what]
portion of the time expended relate[d]: to the modification and the fraud
claim; (2) "it is impossible to tell what portion of the time was expended
with respect to those issues upon which [Respondent]... prevailed;" (3) "it
is very clear that [Respondent] in this case engaged in overkill to an
enormous degree with respect to attorney time, costs, expert witnesses and
the like;" (4) "the facts and issues in this matter were not unusually
difficult," but Respondent worked "many more hours than what would be
reasonable;"
Wilde at 349.
Most of these factors are applicable in this case as they pertain to the Petitioner.
Respondent submits that the Petitioner and her counsel have engaged in "overkill to an
enormous degree." The amount of time expended by Petitioner's counsel is greatly in
excess of that expended by Respondent's counsel even though both have done
comparable amounts of work in this matter. The hourly rate charged by Petitioner's
counsel is on the high end of fees charge by attorney's practicing divorce litigation in this
locality which results in a greatly inflated claim for fees.
The facts and issues in this matter are not unusually difficult. Petitioner took the
firm position throughout the proceedings, that neither the alimony nor the child support
awards in this case were subject to modification when the law is quite clear that they are.
Respondent had to pursue this matter through to trial as a result of the Petitioner's refusal
to accept the applicable law in this area and even discuss a possible resolution of this
matter.
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POINT VII
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IS IMPROPER WITHOUT
FINDINGS OF NEED AND ABILITY TO PAY
Respondent acknowledges that in the context of divorce proceedings, "[t]he
decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound
discretion of the trial court," however, the court must "base the award on evidence of the
receiving spousefs financial need, the payor spousefs ability to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested fees." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). "Failure to consider these factors is
grounds for reversal on the fee issue." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P2d 438, 444 (Utah Ct. App.
1998). "Moreover, [s]uch an award must be based on sufficient findings regarding these
factors." Shinkoskev v. Shinkoskev, 2001 UT App 44 If 18, 19 P.3d 1005. "This enables
an appellate court to determine if the trial court has abused its discretion. Without
adequate findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate review." Willey v. Willey
951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997).
In this case, the court awarded attorney's fees to the Petitioner and awarded her a
judgment for that amount. However, in its findings of fact, the court did not make any of
the required findings necessary to justify an award of attorney's fees. See Walters v.
Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
There was no evidence adduced at trial regarding the factors which the court must take
into consideration in making an award of attorney's fees.
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In this case, the court accepted and adopted as being reasonable the Respondent's
gross and net monthly income and his monthly living expenses. The Respondent's net
monthly income is $4,183.58. Taking into account the reduced child support amount, his
reasonable monthly expenses are $5,203.21 which results in a net negative cash flow
each month of <$1,019.63>. Analyzing it another way, after paying alimony of $800 and
child support of $977 each month to the Petitioner, the Respondent is left with only
$2,406.58 each month to meet his own monthly living expenses which are reasonable and
necessary.
The Respondent's net cash intake from her employment, child support and
alimony received totals $4,087.42. In other words, the Respondent brings in $1,680.84
more per month than does the Petitioner. The Respondent does not have the ability to
pay any of the Petitioner's attorney's fees after taking into consideration his current
financial obligations and the disparity in the parties' respective net monthly incomes.
Further, at the time of trial, the court ordered that both of the parties present their
billing statements reflecting all payments made on the respective accounts. Respondent
has complied. Petitioner has not. Respondent questions whether the Petitioner has even
incurred any attorney's fees or has been obligated to pay any to her attorney. Respondent
requests that the court order Petitioner's counsel to comply and provide a complete and
accurate payment record of the claimed attorney's fees.
Finally, in light of the foregoing arguments and existing case law regarding the
termination of alimony, it is fair and reasonable that the Respondent's alimony obligation
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to the Petitioner be terminated or, at the very least, substantially reduced. As such, the
award of attorney's fees with the accompanying judgment should be negated in total.
CONCLUSION
In this case, it is clear that the Petitioner experienced a substantial material change
in circumstances which was not contemplated in the decree of divorce. At the time of the
settlement agreement between the parties settling the divorce case, the Petitioner was not
employed, had no income and was not in school and had not been attending school on a
regular and consistent basis. Her subsequent attendance and completion of her college
education and ultimate obtaining of a job were issues and facts which were not
contemplated in the settlement agreement or the decree. There is no language that it was
every expected or contemplated that the Petitioner would ever become employed.
Further, the trial court erred by going around the original settlement agreement
and making a retroactive finding that the original alimony award was not sufficient to
meet the Petitioner's needs at the time of the divorce. It went back and looked at the
Petitioner's Financial Declaration, the contents of which were never agreed to by the
parties as being accurate in any way. In doing so, it completely disregarded all of the
facts, evidence and discussions which were exchanged at the original mediation which
produced the agreement between the parties including the Petitioner's agreement to
accept the original alimony amount.
While the trial court's adjustment and reduction of the Respondent's child support
obligation to the Petitioner was consistent with the applicable laws, its refusal to make
such adjustment retroactive to the month following service of the summons and petition
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to modify on the Petitioner was not. Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9.3(4), supported by
the cited authorities herein, clearly dictate and mandate that any such adjustment be made
retroactive.
As a result of the trial court's erroneous consideration of evidence and rulings
which run contrary to both statutory and case law, it should have granted the
Respondent's motion for a new trial and its decision to deny the Respondent's motion
was in error.
Finally, in light of the fact that the trial court made no specific findings concerning
the issue of attorney's fees in this matter, said issue should be remanded for final
determination.
Based upon the foregoing authorities and arguments, the Respondent submits and
requests that the Respondent's alimony obligation to the Petitioner should be terminated
inasmuch as the Petitioner is now earning an income which more than triples her need at
the time of the divorce based upon a material substantial change in her circumstances.
Further, the child support modification should be made retroactive and the award of
attorney's fees granted by the trial court should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //Jwoi

August 2006.

Respondent/Appellant
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APPENDIX
1.

§30-3-5(8)(g)(I) Utah Code Annotated.

2.

§78-45-7.2(8)(b) Utah Code Annotated.

3.

§78-45-9.3(4) Utah Code Annotated.

4.

Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeal from order
Attorney fees
—Amount
— Criteria for award
—Findings required
—Reasonable
—Timing
Appeal from order.
An awaid of fees to the defendant was upheld
on appeal where the plaintiff did not challenge
any of the findings entered by the trial court in
support of the award Bolhger v Bolhger, 997
P 2 d 903 (Utah Ct App 2000)
Attorney fees.
—Amount.
Where the trial court addressed the three
required findings necessary m awarding attor
ney's fees, 1 e , the receiving spouse's financial
need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested fees, an argument by the receiving spouse that was based on
nothing more t h a n her dissatisfaction with the
award did not show an abuse of discretion by
the trial court in awarding fees Childs v
Childs, 967 P 2 d 942 (Utah Ct App 1998), cert
denied, 982 P 2 d 88 (Utah 1999)
—Criteria for award.
Where the trial court found t h a t one party
h a d a need for attorney fees, t h a t the other
party had the ability to pay, and t h a t the fees
were necessary and reasonable, the findings
were sufficient to affirm an award of fees based

on the parties' earned income ratios Rehn v
Rehn, 1999 UT App 41 974 P 2 d 306
—Findings required.
It was an abuse of discretion foi the trial
court to order the parties to a divorce proceed
mg to pay their own attorney's fees and costs
without making findings as to the recipient
spouse's need, the payor spouse's ability to pay,
and the reasonableness of the requested fees
Wilde v Wilde, 969 P 2 d 438 (Utah Ct App
1998)
Where the trial coui t ordered both parties to
pay their own attorney fees, but made no findings about either party's need for or ability to
pay attorney fees, remand was required for
reconsideration and the entry of findings Williamson v Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, 983
P 2 d 1103
—Reasonable.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding the wife $ 2,500 in attorney fees, as
the trial court was pei mitted to do so under this
section and the trial court made sufficient findings regarding the parties' income to support
such an award Davis v Davis, 2003 UT App
282, 479 Utah Adv Rep 6, 76 P 3 d 716
—Timing.
In a child support modification case, the
court could ordei an awaid of attorney fees
before receiving wife's attorney fees affidavit
because the issue of fees was still before the
court and late submission of the affidavit was
not prejudicial to the father Remhart v Reinhart, 963 P 2 d 757 (Utah Ct App 1998)

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and parent-time — Determination of
alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
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(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and t h a t the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children
born to the mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added
to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall
consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time
or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any
peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule
entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of
a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines t h a t the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent,
or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate
family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by
the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parenttime.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children
requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or
operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by
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the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during
the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living t h a t existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living t h a t existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, t h a t change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during t h e marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at
the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient t h a t did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances t h a t justify t h a t action.
(hi) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial
ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse
if the court finds t h a t the payor's improper conduct justifies t h a t
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer t h a n the number
of years t h a t the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances t h a t justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court t h a t a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage or death of t h a t former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment
and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court t h a t a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony t h a t the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.
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the prospective support shall be the amount as stated in
the order, without a showing of a material change of
circumstances, if the stipulated provision:
(i) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds
the base child support award required by the guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result
of the obligor's voluntary reduction of income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in
circumstances has occurred, or a petition to modify an order
under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been filed, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall require each
party to file a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court shall establish support after considering all
relevant factors, including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or
other benefits received by the adult child or on the adult
child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income;
(f) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(g) the ages of the parties; and
(h) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for
the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon the Uniform Child
Support Guidelines described in this chapter.
1998
78-45-7.1.

Medical e x p e n s e s of d e p e n d e n t c h i l d r e n —
A s s i g n i n g responsibility for p a y m e n t — Ins u r a n c e coverage — I n c o m e withholding.
The court shall include the following in its order:
(1) a provision assigning responsibility for the payment
of reasonable and necessary medical expenses for the
dependent children;
(2) a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate insurance for the medical expenses
of dependent children, if coverage is or becomes available
at a reasonable cost; and
(3) provisions for income withholding, in accordance
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5.
1998

78-45-7.2. Application of g u i d e l i n e s — Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative
order establishing or modifying an award of child support
entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a
rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the
amount of temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions
and considerations required by the guidelines, the award
amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines,
and the use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under
the provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record
supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of
the guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from
use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in
the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to
rebut the presumption in that case. If an order rebuts the
presumption through findings, it is considered a deviated
order.

78-45-7.2

(4) The following shall be considered deviations from the
guidelines, if:
(a) the order includes a written finding that it is a
nonguidelines order;
(b) the guidelines worksheet has the box checked for a
deviation and has an explanation as to the reason; or
(c) the deviation was made because there were more
children than provided for in the guidelines table.
(5) If the amount in the order and the amount on the
guidelines worksheet differ, but the difference is less than $10,
the order shall not be considered deviated and the incomes
listed on the worksheet may be used in adjusting support for
emancipation.
(6) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who
live in the home of that parent and are not children in
common to both parties may at the option of either party
be taken into account under the guidelines in setting or
modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (7). Credit may not be given if:
(i) by giving credit to the obligor, children for
whom a prior support order exists would have their
child support reduced; or
(ii) by giving credit to the obligee for a present
family, the obligation of the obligor would increase,
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the respective parents for the
additional children. The obligations shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before determining the award in the instant case.
(7) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or adoptive children born after entry of the
order and who are not in common to both parties may be
applied to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be
applied:
(a) for the benefit of the obligee if the credit would
increase the support obligation of the obligor from the
most recent order; or
(b) for the benefit of the obligor if the amount of
support received by the obligee would be decreased from
the most recent order.
(8) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or
modified within the previous three years, a parent, legal
guardian, or the office may petition the court to adjust the
amount of a child support order.
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (8)(a),
the court shall, taking into account the best interests of
the child, determine whether there is a difference between
the amount ordered and the amount that would be required under the guidelines. If there is a difference of 10%
or more and the difference is not of a temporary nature,
the court shall adjust the amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines.
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances
is not necessary for an adjustment under Subsection
(8Kb).
(9) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any
time petition the court to adjust the amount of a child
support order if there has been a substantial change in
circumstances.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (9)(a), a substantial
change in circumstances may include:
(i) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or
assets of the parties;
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income
of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to
earn;

78-45-7.3

JUDICIAL CODE

(v) material changes in the medical needs of the
child; and
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities
of either parent for the support of others.
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a),
the court shall, taking into account the best interests of
the child, determine whether a substantial change has
occurred. If it has, the court shall then determine whether
the change results in a difference of 15% or more between
the amount of child support ordered and the amount that
would be required under the guidelines. If there is such a
difference and the difference is not of a temporary nature,
the court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered
to t h a t which is provided for in the guidelines.
(10) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order
under Subsections (8) and (9) shall be included in each child
support order issued or modified after July 1, 1997.
2003
78-45-7.3. P r o c e d u r e — D o c u m e n t a t i o n — S t i p u l a t i o n .
(1) In any matter in which child support is ordered, the
moving party shall submit:
{a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection
78-45-7.5(5);
(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the
amount of child support requested is consistent with the
guidelines; and
(d) the information required under Subsection (3).
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not available, a verified representation of the
other party's income by the moving party, based on the
best evidence available, may be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only
be offered after a copy has been provided to the other
party in accordance with U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure or
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in
an administrative proceeding.
(3) Upon the entry of an order in a proceeding to establish
paternity or to establish, modify, or enforce a support order,
each party shall file identifying information and shall update
t h a t information as changes occur with the court t h a t conducted the proceeding.
(a) The required identifying information shall include
the person's social security number, driver's license number, residential and mailing addresses, telephone numbers, the name, address and telephone number of employers, and any other data required by the United States
Secretary of Health and H u m a n Services.
(b) Attorneys representing the office in child support
services cases are not required to file the identifying
information required by Subsection (3)(a).
(4) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child
support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the
stipulated child support amount or combined amount equals
or exceeds the base child support award required by the
guidelines.
2000
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted g r o s s i n c o m e u s e d .
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each
parent's share of the base combined child support obligation.
Only income of the n a t u r a l or adoptive parents of the child
may be used to determine the award under these guidelines
1994

78-45-7.5.

D e t e r m i n a t i o n of g r o s s i n c o m e — I m p u t e d
income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including
nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3); and
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(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends,
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony
from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social
security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability
insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeanstested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the
equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if
during the time prior to the original support order, the parent
normally and consistently worked more t h a n 40 hours at his
job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter
3, P a r t 3, Family Employment Program;
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program,
the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security
Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid,
Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of
a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary
expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from
self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income
available to the parent to satisfy a child support award.
Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to
operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection
may differ from the amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current
income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs
or employer statements and complete copies of tax ret u r n s from at least the most recent year unless the court
finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay
stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to
determine
whether
an
underemployment
or
overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent
under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the
parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the party defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and a
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed
or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be
based upon employment potential and probable earnings
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications,
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning ft>r
persons in the same occupation in the same geographical
area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their
occupation is unknown, income shall be imputed at least
at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. T 3
impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceed-
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(a) is required by a prior court or administrative order
to:
(i) share those expenses with the other parent of
the dependent child; or
(ii) obtain insurance for medical expenses but fails
to do so, or
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer under
insurance coverage obtained after the prior court or
administrative order was issued.
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does not
specify what proportions of the expenses are to be shared, the
district court may determine the amount of liability as may be
reasonable and necessary.
(3) This section applies to an order without regard to when
it was issued.
1994
78-45-7.20. Accountability of support p r o v i d e d to benefit child -— A c c o u n t i n g .
(1) The court or administrative agency which issues the
initial or modified order for child support may, upon the
petition of the obligor, order prospectively the obligee to
furnish an accounting of amounts provided for the child's
benefit to the obligor, including an accounting or receipts.
(2) The court or administrative agency may prescribe the
frequency and the form of the accounting which shall include
receipts and an accounting.
(3) The obligor may petition for the accounting only if
current on all child support that has been ordered.
1994
78-45-7.21. Award of tax e x e m p t i o n for d e p e n d e n t children.
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be
awarded the right to claim a child or children as exemptions
for federal and state income tax purposes. Unless the parties
otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or administrative
agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a
case-by-case basis.
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative
agency shall consider:
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of
each parent to the cost of raising the child; and
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each
parent.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not current in his child support
obligation, in which case the court or administrative agency
may award an exemption to the custodial parent.
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless
the award will result in a tax benefit to that parent.
1994
78-45-7.22. Social security n u m b e r in court records.
The social security number of any individual who is subject
to a support order shall be placed in the records relating to the
matter.
1997
78-45-8. Continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n .
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the
order of support where justice requires.
1957
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support.
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against
the obligor. The office may proceed pursuant to this
chapter or any other applicable statute on behalf of:
(i) the Department of Human Services;
(ii) any other department or agency of this state
that provides public assistance, as defined by Subsection 62A-ll-303(3), to enforce the right to recover
public assistance; or
(iii) the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right of
support against the obligor.

78-45-9.3

(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the
office to enforce payment of the obligor's support obligation, the attorney general or the county attorney of the
county of residence of the obligee shall represent the
office.
(2) (a) A person may not commence an action, file a pleading, or submit a written stipulation to the court, without
complying with Subsection (2Kb), if the purpose or effect
of the action, pleading, or stipulation is to:
(i) establish paternity;
(ii) establish or modify a support obligation;
(iii) change the court-ordered manner of payment
of support;
(iv) recover support due or owing; or
(v) appeal issues regarding child support laws.
(b) (i) When taking an action described in Subsection
(2)(a), a person must file an affidavit with the court at
the time the action is commenced, the pleading is
filed, or the stipulation is submitted stating whether
child support services have been or are being provided under Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C., Section 601 et seq., on behalf of a child who is
a subject of the action, pleading, or stipulation.
(ii) If child support services have been or are being
provided, under Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C., Section 601 et seq., the person shall mail a
copy of the affidavit and a copy of the pleading or
stipulation to the Office of the Attorney General,
Child Support Division.
(iii) If notice is not given in accordance with this
Subsection (2), the office is not bound by any decision,
judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered in the
action. For purposes of appeals, service must be made
on the Office of the Director for the Office of Recovery
Services.
(c) If IV-D services have been or are being provided,
that person shall join the office as a party to the action, or
mail or deliver a written request to the Office of the
Attorney General, Child Support Division asking the
office to join as a party to the action. A copy of that
request, along with proof of service, shall be filed with the
court. The office shall be represented as provided in
Subsection (1Kb).
(3) Neither the attorney general nor the county attorney
represents or has an attorney-client relationship with the
obligee or the obligor in carrying out the duties under this
chapter.
2003
78-45-9.1.

Repealed.

1984

78-45-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee.
The county attorney's office shall provide assistance to an
obligee desiring to proceed under this act in the following
manner:
(1) provide forms, approved by the Judicial Council of
Utah, for an order of wage assignment if the obligee is not
represented by legal counsel;
(2) the county attorney's office may charge a fee not to
exceed $25 for providing assistance to an obligee under
Subsection (1).
(3) inform the obligee of the right to file impecuniously
if the obligee is unable to bear the expenses of the action
and assist the obligee with such filing;
(4) advise the obligee of the available methods for
service of process; and
(5) assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a
hearing before the court.
1983
78-45-9.3.

P a y m e n t under child support order — Judgment.
(1) All monthly payments of child support shall be due on
the 1st day of each month for purposes of child support
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services pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 3, income
withholding services pursuant to P a r t 4, and income withholding procedures pursuant to Part 5
(2) For purposes of child support services and income withholding pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 11, P a r t 3 and P a r t 4,
child support is not considered past due until the 1st day of the
following month For purposes other t h a n those specified in
Subsection (1) support shall be payable XA by the 5th day of
each month and Vz by the 20th day of that month, unless the
order or decree provides for a different time for payment
(3) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support
under any child support order, as defined by Section 78-45-2,
is, on and after the date it is due
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of
any judgment of a district court, except as provided in
Subsection (4),
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in
this and in any other jurisdiction, and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any
other jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (4)
(4) A child or spousal support payment under a child
support order may be modified with respect to any period
during which a modification is pending, but only from the date
of service of the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the
petitioner, or on the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner' If7
the tribunal orders that the support should be modified, the I
effective date of the modification shall be the month following/
service on the parent whose support is affected Once the
tribunal determines t h a t a modification is appropriate, the
tribunal shall order a judgment to be entered for any difference m the original order and the modified amount for the
period from the service of the pleading until the final order of
modification is entered
(5) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a state
or political subdivision, a territory or possession of the United
States, t h e District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Native American Tribe, or other comparable
domestic or foreign jurisdiction
(6) The judgment provided for in Subsection (3)(a), to be
effective and enforceable as a hen against the real property
interest of any third party relying on the public record, shall
be docketed in the district court in accordance with Sections
78-22 1 and 62A-11-312 5
2003

CHAPTER 45b
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN [REPEALED]
78-45b-l t o 78-45b-25.

H u s b a n d a n d wife p r i v i l e g e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n
i n a p p l i c a b l e — C o m p e t e n c y of s p o u s e s .
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of commu
mcations between husband and wife are inapplicable under
this act Spouses are competent witnesses to testify to any
relevant matter, including marriage and parentage
1957
78-45-12.

R i g h t s are i n a d d i t i o n to t h o s e p r e s e n t l y
existing.
The rights herein created are in addition to and not in
substitution to any other rights
1957

78-45-13. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and c o n s t r u c t i o n .
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it
1957
CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY [REPEALED]
78-45a-l t o 78-45a-17.

Repealed.

2005

1985,1987,1988

CHAPTER 45c
UTAH UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
AND ENFORCEMENT ACT
Section
78-45c-l to 78-45c-26 Repealed
Part 1
78-45c-101
78-45c-102
78-45c-103
78-45c-104
78-45c-105
78-45c-106
78 45c-107
78-45c-108
78 45c-109
78-45c-110
78 45c-111
78-45c 112

General P r o v i s i o n s
Title
Definitions
Proceedings governed by other law
Application to Indian tribes
International application of chapter
Binding force of child custody determmation
Priority
Notice to persons outside state
Appearance and limited immunity
Communication between courts
Taking testimony 111 another state
Cooperation between courts — Preservation of
records
Part 2
Jurisdiction

78-45c-201
78-45c-202
78-45c-203
78-45c 204
78-45c-205
78-45c-206
78 45c 207
78-45c-208
78 45c-209
78-45c-210

Initial child custody jurisdiction
Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
Jurisdiction to modify determination
Temporary emergency jurisdiction
Notice — Opportunity to be heard — Joinder
Simultaneous proceedings
Inconvenient forum
Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct
Information to be submitted to court
Appearance of parties and child
Part 3

78-45-10. Appeals.
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments under
this act as in other civil actions
1957
78-45-11.

Repealed.

Enforcement
78-45c-301
78-45c-302
78 45c-303
78-45c-304
78-45c 305
78-45c 306
78-45c-307
78-45c-308
78-45c 309
78-45c 310
78-45c-311
78-45c-312
78-45c-313
78-45c 314
78-45c-315
78 45c-316
78 45c-317
78-45c-318

Definitions
Scope — Hague Convention Enforcement
Duty to enforce
Temporary paient-time
Registration of child custody determination
Enforcement of registered determmation
Simultaneous proceedings
Expedited enforcement of child custody determination
Service of petition and order
Hearing and order
Writ to take physical custody of child
Costs, fees, and expenses
Recognition and enforcement
Appeals
Role of prosecutoi or attorney general
Role of law enforcement
Costs and expenses
Transitional provision

78-45c-l to 78-45c-26.

Repealed.

2000
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Rule 59

the substance thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of the
•lc]o-ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfaction,
(d> Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall have been satisfied, in
whole or in part, or as to any judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered
upon the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent of such
satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction,
if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution
shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such partial satisfaction and shall
direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from the
judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction
of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the county
where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction,
or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with the
clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment may have
been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same effect as
in the county where the same was originally entered.
Compiler's N o t e s . — There is no federal
rule covering this subject matter.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Acceptance of full payment.
Effect.
Attachment
v, ,.
J-- c 4-r
Vacation of satisfaction.

Attachment.
Court had duty to make order directing par^ a ^ satisfaction of judgment to extent of money
collected through attachment proceeding.
^ ^ y ^ ^
^ ^ ^ ^
^ p »m
^

Acceptance of full p a y m e n t .

Vacation of satisfaction.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without
action and hearing in equity and the lien of an
attorney against the proceeds of the judgment
does not include his personal right to execute
against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V. Fed.
Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 R2d 1187 (Utah
1974).

—Effect.
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full payment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction
. and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge
everything merged in and adjudicated by the
•judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien
Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943 (1916).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 1004 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.

A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of
judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.

Rule 59. New trials; a m e n d m e n t s of judgment*
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, t h a t on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
' (a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
Prevented from having a fair trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on
an
y question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by

Rule 59
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chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit
of any one of the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
t h a t it is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later t h a n
10 days after t h e entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later t h a n 10 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's N o t e s . — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Harmless error not
Lot
ground for new trial, U.R.C.P. 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Abandonment of motion.
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Burden of proof.
Caption on motion for new trial.
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record.
Costs.
Decision against law.
Discretion of trial court.
Effect of order granting new trial.
Effect of untimely motion.
Evidence.
—Insufficiency.
—Sufficiency.
Excessive or inadequate damages.
—Punitive damages.
—Waiver.
Failure to object to findings of fact.
Failure to order discover}7.
Filing of affidavits.
Grounds for new trial.
—Particularization in motion
Improper statement by counsel.
Incompetence or negligence of counsel.
Misconduct of jury.
Motion to alter or amend judgment.
Motion to be presented to trial court.

Newly discovered evidence.
New trial on initiative of court.
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial.
Reconsideration of motion for new trial.
Sanctions.
Settlement bars appeal.
Summary judgment.
Time for motion.
Tolling time for appeal.
Waiver.
Cited.
A b a n d o n m e n t of m o t i o n .
Abandonment of motion for new trial must be
intentional, and the facts must indicate this
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d
1043 (Utah 1984).
Accident or surprise.
This section requires t h a t the moving party
show t h a t ordinary prudence was exercised to
guard against the accident or surprise. Powers
v. Genes Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174
(Utah 1977).
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on the
basis of surprise concerning testimony of the
defendant s expert witness where the plaintiff
failed to object to the testimony either before, or

